Xinjiang’s Re-Education and Securitization Campaign: Evidence from Domestic Security Budgets
Chinese govt has repeatedly framed Xinjiang camps as vocational centers, but new findings from @adrianzenz show 2017 security budgets skyrocketed, while budget for vocational education shrank 7 percent. https://t.co/VEQy1psdpz pic.twitter.com/IaA6B2krRG
— Owen Churchill (@owenschurchill) 6. November 2018
Official data tells a different story: Spending on prisons and detention centers doubled and quadrupled, while spending on criminal investigation stagnated or even declined. https://t.co/3toUJ4SzX2
— Adrian Zenz (@adrianzenz) 6. November 2018
Uyghur crackdown in Xinjiang doubles security spending in one yearhttps://t.co/UJlXxpdiZt
— International News (@CNNInternatDesk) 6. November 2018
Latest for @dw_chinese: @adrianzenz published another significant paper to prove #China’s rapid construction and expansion of the imprisonment facilities in Xinjiang. (With input from @PeteCIrwin) https://t.co/FSEW6qnlDZ
— William Yang (@WilliamYang120) 6. November 2018
„Welcome to Xinjiang“ says China in Geneva, yet Western media attemps to investigate the „colorful vocational training“ centers are firmly rebuffed by omnipresent security forces. https://t.co/Z88tt1tNHg
— Adrian Zenz (@adrianzenz) 6. November 2018
Now another form of mass relocations in Xinjiang, Sounds similar to relocation of nomads in Tibetan regions, which often causes a removal of familiar livelihood strategies. Compare native American settlements. https://t.co/Y3ABxAHKjK
— Adrian Zenz (@adrianzenz) 6. November 2018
Uyghurs & Tibetans are marching towards the Broken Chair outside the UN while China undergoes its 3rd Cycle UPR.#ChinaUPR #CloseTheCamps pic.twitter.com/2GnKxWalfO
— WorldUyghurCongress (@UyghurCongress) 6. November 2018
#Pakistan, as #OIC Coordinator, has nothing to say on mass detention of #Uyghur Muslims during UPR review of #China. Really?? @PakUNgeneva @OIC_IPHRC #UPR31
— John Fisher (@JohnFisher_hrw) 6. November 2018
Very revealing: scratch the surface and delegation of #China at #UPR31 quickly drops the façade to dismiss human rights defenders as criminals, Falun Gong as „evil sect“, and Uyghur as terrorists. This is why #UNHRC must look beneath the surface & move to action.
— John Fisher (@JohnFisher_hrw) 6. November 2018
The report „also found that despite Xinjiang’s purported large “vocational training” campaign, employment outcomes had not markedly improved, according to the region’s own official employment figures.“ https://t.co/Tn5JNDPZMt
— Adrian Zenz (@adrianzenz) 6. November 2018
Numerous Uyghurs point out that their detained loved ones are in no need for vocational training and their whereabouts are unknown.
My new research shows that Xinjiang is pursuing political re-education rather than genuine vocational education. https://t.co/L8JAUbYvZi— Adrian Zenz (@adrianzenz) 6. November 2018
Conclusion: The actual employment benefit of the camps’ re-education “training” is questionable. Quite the contrary: the real goal of Xinjiang’s “skills training” campaign appears to be political indoctrination and intimidation.
— Adrian Zenz (@adrianzenz) 5. November 2018
Whatever “employment training” these facilities provide is not administered by the vocational edu system. Explains why teacher recruitment notices for the newly constructed re-education system do not require tertiary degrees or relevant skills (NOT genuine vocational education).
— Adrian Zenz (@adrianzenz) 5. November 2018
In 2018, numbers of newly-employed „poor“ persons decreased compared to 2017, 2016 and 2015 (based on Q1-3 data)! Meaning the “vocational training” campaign has not actually improved employment among the campaign’s target population.
— Adrian Zenz (@adrianzenz) 5. November 2018
In minority regions, spending on domestic security exceeded that on vocational training by nearly 20 times in 2017 (vs. only 6.5 times in 2016)
Data shows consistent differences between counties with a Muslim minority population of at least 35% and those with a lower share.— Adrian Zenz (@adrianzenz) 5. November 2018
Generally, spending on clandestine „catch-all“ security budget items explain most of the stunning 93% increase in Xinjiang’s security spending. Most of these budget items relate to facility construction and equipping.
— Adrian Zenz (@adrianzenz) 5. November 2018
A real concern is rising spending on prison / detention / re-education but stagnant or reduced spending on courts / prosecution. Evidently, the „criminals“ involved in „minor offenses“ were never tried and convicted, but simply detained.
— Adrian Zenz (@adrianzenz) 5. November 201
Expenditures on detention centers in counties with large concentrations of ethnic minorities QUADRUPLED, indicating that re-education is not the only form of mass detainment in the XUAR.
— Adrian Zenz (@adrianzenz) 5. November 2018
– Spending on prisons doubled 2016-17, while that on the formal prosecution of criminal suspects (courts…) stagnated.
– Re-education camp construction has apparently largely been funded by the same authorities than oversaw the former national re-education through labor system— Adrian Zenz (@adrianzenz) 5. November 2018
Key findings:
– Vocational education spending in Xinjiang actually decreased from 2016 to 2017!
– Spending on clandestine budget items that explain nearly all security-related facility construction rose massively (esp. in minority regions), by nearly RMB 20bn (213%) in 2017— Adrian Zenz (@adrianzenz) 5. November 2018
BREAKING: my NEW research report on Xinjiang’s security spending, w/ focus on detention / re-education spending, exposing state claims re supposed „vocational“ training, via @ChinaBriefJT. THREAD w/ key findings & add’l data below.https://t.co/vhEhl1S8qr pic.twitter.com/0xRDEXG8uV
— Adrian Zenz (@adrianzenz) 5. November 2018
#CIIE2018: #Lithuania’s export opportunities are being introduced in #China pic.twitter.com/lvenCdCXzD
— Dalia GrybauskaitÄ (@Grybauskaite_LT) 5. November 2018
JP FM Kono: „If any country gets into an agreement with the Korean govt in intl law and the Korean Sup Ct could overturn the agreement any time they wish to, it would be difficult for any country to do anything with the Kor govt,’’ https://t.co/9vfOYTpplb via @bpolitics
— Julian Ku 古舉倫 (@julianku) 4. November 2018
What is China hiding if these „training“ camps are really such wonderful places? https://t.co/LQe1jlAtH4
— Adrian Zenz (@adrianzenz) 5. November 2018
Elementary school students in Urumqi are required to investigate books and audio/videos at home for “problematic” content and fill out this report. https://t.co/l028BzESii
— Yaxue Cao (@YaxueCao) 5. November 2018
Millennials are good at technology but unless there is a webinar on changing the clock on a 2003 microwave for daylight saving time, step aside and let Generation X get this one.
— Simon Holland (@simoncholland) 4. November 201
Attacks on activists in #Ukraine like Kateryna #Handziuk, who died yesterday after being attacked with sulphuric acid in July, must not go unpunished. All those responsible must face justice. https://t.co/J79h0FuZ85 pic.twitter.com/moNnqy1nFK
— Transparency Int’l (@anticorruption) 5. November 201
Account of a women who endured multiple detentions in Xinjiang, including this year. 68 women in one cell. https://t.co/ICWZrSPR91
— Adrian Zenz (@adrianzenz) 3. November 2018
Academic Freedom Watchdog Demands #China Unconditionally Release Prominent #Uyghur Scholar.
— claudio tecchio (@DossierTibet) 3. November 2018
The @UyghurCongress is joined by eight other NGOs to jointly call for greater transparency from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights re: removal or key stakeholder information ahead of #ChinaUPR tomorrow.
Text: https://t.co/D9NmG43INO pic.twitter.com/FSNzTiZVWz
— WorldUyghurCongress (@UyghurCongress) 5. November 201
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